







So many managers, so little vision: registered social landlords 
and consortium schemes in the UK. 
 
Tony Manzi 
Bill Smith Bowers 
School of Architecture and the Built Environment 
 
 
This is an electronic version of an article published in European Journal of 
Housing Policy, 4(1), pp. 57-75, April 2004. European Journal of Housing Policy 







The Eprints service at the University of Westminster aims to make the research output of 
the University available to a wider audience.  Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the 
authors and/or copyright owners. 
Users are permitted to download and/or print one copy for non-commercial private study 
or research.  Further distribution and any use of material from within this archive for 




Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, you 
may freely distribute the URL of the University of Westminster Eprints 
(http://eprints.wmin.ac.uk). 
 




So Many Managers, So Little Vision: Registered Social 
Landlords and Consortium Schemes in the UK 
 
Tony Manzi and Bill Smith Bowers 
London Research Focus Group 
University of Westminster 
School of Architecture and the Built Environment 
35 Marylebone Road 
London NW1 5LS 
Tel: ++44 20 7911 5000 









The broad trajectory of housing policy since the 1980s has been to reject the 
paternalism and bureaucracy of traditional local authority landlords and to 
encourage voluntary sector housing providers. The rationale for these strategies 
has been to use a diversity of landlords (to create synergy and avoid monolithic 
structures) and to encourage a mix of tenures (to develop sustainable 
communities and avoid ‘ghettoisation’). However, to date the practical 
management implications of such schemes have not been subject to detailed 
empirical research. Consequently, this article considers the application of 
contemporary ideas about housing management in the UK within the context of a 
consortium development built in the early 1990s. Based upon an in-depth study 
of one of the first and largest housing association consortium schemes, the 
article critically considers the central management issues facing the different 
participants in the scheme. It illustrates how the management of the post 1988 
housing association developments has brought considerable difficulties, which 
have been exacerbated within multi-landlord developments. In such cases the 
consequence has been to entrench problems of marginalisation and social 
exclusion. The conclusion identifies the problems that registered social landlords 
will need to address if they are to improve their management systems. 
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Introduction: the policy context 
 
Multiple landlord and mixed tenure developments have been a key strategy for 
UK housing providers since the late 1980s. Rather than simply improving council 
estates, a policy of tenure diversification was intended as a ‘central plank’ 
(Capita, 1996: 41) of council housing schemes in the 1980s and 1990s, 
particularly through programmes such as Estate Action, Right to Buy, Tenants 
Choice, Housing Action Trusts, and Large Scale Voluntary Transfer (Malpass 
and Means, 1993) 
 
The ‘brave new world’ of housing finance heralded in the Housing Act 1988 
brought registered social landlords (RSLs, formerly called housing associations 
prior to the 1996 Housing Act) into a new regime of public grant combined with 
private finance, development risk management and competition which has 
offered a stark contrast to the comfort of the pre 1989 environment (Walker, 
1998; 2000). In particular, RSLs found themselves confronted with the 
challenges of managing large developments whereas their previous experience 
had mainly been limited to smaller developments or scattered street properties. 
The financial incentives offered to housing organisations by the Act also 
encouraged an innovative type of development, in which a number of diverse 
landlords in terms of size and needs groups bid for funding to develop large 
numbers of properties on a single site as part of a development consortium. The 
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advantages that these consortium schemes offered were that they allowed risk to 
be shared amongst a range of landlords; provided greater funding opportunities 
through joint bids submitted to the Housing Corporation; enabled economies of 
scale through the sharing of professional expertise and avoided the construction 
of monolithic housing estates dominated by a single landlord. Studies throughout 
the 1960s and 1970s had shown how the problems of local authority housing 
management resulted from hierarchical structures, paternalism and a lack of 
concern for residents (Burbidge et. al, 1981; Dunleavy, 1981; Power, 1987).  
Influenced by new management approaches, housing policy delivered through 
the housing association sector would allow a combination of organisational 
styles; a more effective pooling of resources; a more flexible response and a 
more pluralistic policy environment. The theory was that these approaches would 
avoid the dramatic mistakes witnessed in the mass housing era. 
 
RSLs were at the forefront of new initiatives in the late 1980s as local authorities 
were relegated to a strategic enabling role, facilitating new development and 
funding housing association  development via land use arrangements or the use 
of funding (through Local Authority Social Housing Grant). RSLs were seen as 
part of the private sector using the newly created ‘assured’ tenancy agreements 
created by the 1988 Housing Act. As private sector institutions, RSLs were 
generally viewed by central government as more professional, business-like, with 
a single purpose and operating on a smaller scale than their municipal 
bureaucratic forebears (Randolph, 1993).  Government policy was also designed 
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to increase the diversity of tenures and to encourage RSLs to develop rented 
property alongside shared ownership schemes (Martin and Wilkinson, 2003). 
 
A policy of stock transfer was also pursued with the result that between 1991/2 
and 1993/4 over 23,000 council properties were transferred in to housing 
association ownership (Crook et. al., 1996). Additionally, as Tunstall (2003, 
p.154) comments, throughout the 1990s, planning policies (through Section 106 
agreements) increasingly sought to create a social mix by incorporating social 
housing properties into developments originally intended for private occupation.  
 
A further direction for housing association activities, which emerged in the 
second half of the 1990s, was the Government vision for them to play a key role 
in the regeneration of local areas. This objective was aimed at providing effective 
strategies means to tackle problems of social exclusion through improved 
management, joined-up working and participation arrangements. This theme 
emerged with the ‘housing plus’ agenda and has grown and been ever present in 
government urban renewal strategies such as ‘City Challenge’ and the ‘Single 
Regeneration Budget’ programme (Hill, 2000). The strength of the housing 
association sector was seen to rest in its ability to work in an effective partnership 
with a range of service providers free from the bureaucratic constraints that 
typified local authority service provision. Thus the key to developing an effective 
community structure rested on joint problem solving, project management and 
synergistic strategies. Over the last 5 years a focus on ‘neighbourhood effects’ 
 7 
(Atkinson and Kintrea, 2002) has resulted in initiatives that have targeted 
communities as much as physical redevelopment. Such initiatives have been 
strongly supported through central government programmes such as the New 
Deal for Communities launched in 1998 and Neighbourhood Renewal strategies 
(see the Social Exclusion Unit 1997; 2001 and the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit, 
2002). RSLs have been strongly encouraged to play a leading role in developing 
innovative partnership schemes (Forrest and Kearns, 1999). The 2000 Urban 
White Paper encapsulated these approaches based on partnership, participation, 
and social cohesion (DETR, 2000b) with planning guidance recommending that 
development plans specify the level and amount of social housing to be provided 
in specific sites.  
 
Consequently, a policy of consortium development and mixed tenure is now 
broadly accepted as part of the ‘professional orthodoxy’ of UK housing policy 
(DETR, 2000c). In 2002 a survey found that 48% of RSLs and 58% of local 
authorities claimed that they ‘usually’ or always’ provided mixed tenure in new 
developments (Martin and Wilkinson, 2003). In the London area, the draft 
Mayoral Plan stipulates that new housing developments should have a minimum 
of 50% affordable housing (comprising 35% social rented housing and 15% 
‘intermediate’ housing) (Mayor of London, 2002). Whilst such figures are subject 
to debate about how ‘intermediate’ is defined, what is clear is that the notion of 
tenure mixing within consortium development has become a clear policy 
objective for housing providers.  
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From the RSL perspective a number of studies have looked at the opportunities 
for effective multi-landlord working (for example Groves et. al., 2002; Knox et. al., 
2002). However, there is an unproven claim in some of the literature that there 
was a real efficiency gain arising from the transfer of the development of new 
social housing from the local authority sector to the housing association sector 
(Walker and Jeanes 2001 and Webster and Wai-Chung Lai 2003). In fact there is 
little detailed evidence for these claims or evaluation of the specific form of RSL 
development and management consortium covered in this paper (exceptions 
being Zipfel and Hare, 1995; Page and Boughton, 1997; Jupp, 1999). Whilst 
research is beginning to be collected on the effects of tenure mix and the impact 
of owner occupation and diversification (Capita, 1996; Atkinson and Kintrea, 
1998; Pawson et. al., 2001; Ostendorf et. al., 2001; Martin and Wilkinson, 2003) 
there has not been a great deal of critical evaluation, based on empirical work of 
the schemes developed after 1988 Act. The current study provides an in-depth 
analysis of an estate in what may be termed its ‘mature phase’, when the 
scheme has become embedded within the community. The reports written by 
David Page (1993 and 1994) provided early warnings of a number of issues likely 
to be encountered by RSLs in managing large estates. Page stated: 
 
It is still too early to predict whether large housing association estates built 
using the 1988 Act finding will become future areas of residualised housing. 
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Very few of these large estates are yet fully tenanted and even fewer are 
clear of the settling-in period (Page, 1993, p.52). 
 
These ‘Cassandra’ warnings (Cole, 2000, p.166) can be evaluated ten years 
after the initial Page report. Page argued that the policies to create large RSL 
estates in isolated locations and to allocate properties according to the principle 
of the greatest level of need (via the homelessness allocation process) would not 
be conducive to the development of stable communities. In addition, 
neighbourhood deprivation is driven by various ‘concentration effects’ of 
accommodating large numbers of deprived groups in one location. The effects of 
such policies can be identified through a case study approach. Whilst other 
studies have looked at some of the costs of partnership working (Macarthur et. 
al., 1996) the current article provides a detailed critical discussion of the practical 
impact of RSL developments in consortium schemes alongside other tenure 
types. 
 
Overview of the estate 
 
The case study estate is a large mixed-tenure consortium development of over 




The development was completed in four stages, involving two separate 
consortium arrangements, plus a private development. Work commenced when 
one large housing association and a private developer purchased 144 acres of 
land on a hospital site from the Department of Health. The association then 
developed 144 homes and sold 64 homes to 6 other housing associations. The 
private developer built 142 homes and sold them to a second group of 
associations. The private developer sold the old hospital building and linked land 
to a second private developer.  
 
As a result of these development stages eight social landlords became managers 
of 550 properties on the estate (and 80 units of shared ownership). The private 
developments resulted in a ‘gated’ development of 200 units of owner occupation 
and a private rented sector block of 130 units.  
 
A total of eight social landlords (with a complex mixture of ownership and 
management arrangements) became responsible for the social housing 
development. The development included houses and small blocks of flats. Three 
of the social landlords own around 87% of the properties. The other landlords 
include specialist associations dealing with minority ethnic groups and 
organisations specialising in disability and health issues. Some of these 
organisations were highly sensitive about anonymity. Consequently, the article 
does not identify any of the landlords by name.  
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The ward in which the neighbourhood is located features as one of the twenty 
most deprived in the country as measured by the Index of Multiple Deprivation 
(DETR, 2000a). The estate qualified with three other estates for neighbourhood 
renewal funding in the borough in 2002.  Since 2001 the governance of the 
scheme has been conducted through a management consortium, consisting of all 
the social landlords, local authority officers and members, resident 
representatives (including private leaseholders) and other stakeholders, including 
health and education authority representatives. Monthly partnership forums are 
held with a steering group comprising these members. However, at the beginning 
of the research period in 2001 the steering group was seen as of limited 
effectiveness due to a lack of participation by the smaller landlords. A 
widespread perception had gained root that each landlord was managing alone 
with minimal opportunities for joint contact. What changed the situation was the 
injection of neighbourhood renewal funding which helped to concentrate minds 




The initial study of the estate was commissioned by the local authority as part of 
a ‘neighbourhood profiling’ exercise conducted in 2002. This exercise focused on 
a number of estates within the local authority area. Following the results of the 
resident survey, the main social landlords requested the research team to 
conduct a more detailed qualitative analysis of the estate to inform management 
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improvements. The article therefore utilises a case study approach based upon 
two main sources. One is the neighbourhood profiling exercise incorporating a 
survey of 185 households comprising roughly one-third of the social housing 
residents. When aggregated to represent the residents in the estate this was 
accurate to within a sampling error of ± 6%.   
 
The local authority specified that the survey should only cover the social housing 
tenants. This had a significant impact on the measurement of poverty, income 
deprivation and social attitudes on the estate. The local authority did not regard 
the gated community of owners and the private rented block as part of the estate 
for neighbourhood renewal purposes.  
 
The second study was funded by the major RSLs working on the estate and 
therefore was limited to the social housing residents. However, the research 
included interviews with a range of local stakeholders, including private 
leaseholders and owner occupiers. Interviews included representatives of all the 
RSLs involved in the consortium development and responsible for management 
of the estate. The practitioners included: residents; senior managers with 
responsibility for the scheme; development officers; who had been involved in the 
initial plans; management committee members of the main associations and 
front–line staff. The interviews also included: representatives from the local 
authority, the Primary Care Trust, community and voluntary services, and 
residents. A total of 30 interviews was conducted, with interviewees selected on 
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the basis of their knowledge and involvement in the scheme. The purpose of the 
interviews was to gather more detailed information about the management of the 
neighbourhood, local service delivery and priorities for improvement. Additionally, 
observation and participant observation methods were used over a period of 6 
months on the estate through attendance at meetings of the main decision-
making forums connected with the scheme. The research team were asked to 
produce proposals for improvements to the management arrangements on the 
estate and to give presentations to the main stakeholders on this topic. The 





The estate was initially developed during 1992 at a time of deep recession in the 
housing market and building industry. The Chancellor of the Exchequer 
announced in the budget statement for 1992/93 a ‘Housing Market Package’ 
designed to encourage private developers to sell excess empty properties and 
development sites to social landlords. Thus the estate’s final mix between social 
and private developments was much more a product of market conditions than a 
planned mixed tenure development.  
 
The location of the estate was in an area that had no existing neighbourhood 
infrastructure of services. A minimum of community services therefore had to be 
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provided for the development such as a community hall, play spaces, surgery, 
post office, and bus route.  
 
In the early 1990s, the policy imperative was to encourage RSLs to increase 
units of housing without detailed planning for what we now call sustainability. 
Crucially, most of the associations had little experience of large-scale 
development. With respect to the case study estate, as with other similar 
schemes, there was therefore an initial problem linked to development 
coordination and a lack of knowledge about what other landlords were planning 
to develop on the estate. Managers commented that ‘We had not previously 
developed on that scale. It was mixed-up tenure. One housing association put in 
supported housing, unbeknown to others. There was considerable uncertainty 
about who was doing what’ (Interview, development manager). 
 
The lack of experience of developing and managing large developments was 
evident in a number of responses from RSL managers who felt that ‘we 
replicated the social problems of the council sector’ (Interview, development 
manager). 
 
It was the scale of the problems and the tendency to concentrate a large number 
of vulnerable groups in one small area that was seen to be at the root of many of 
the difficulties in the neighbourhood. These development issues identified a 
number of critical problems including a lack of experience, poor planning, and 
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ineffective coordination. However (and crucially) the local authority admitted that 
they did not perceive their responsibility was to exercise effective oversight. As 
one local authority senior officer commented: 
 
It was not on anybody’s radar. I think that the concept of being a housing 
association site made it invisible. There were so many housing 
associations with a stake in it and all of them politically seem to have 
baled out (Interview).  
 
This meant that later problems, which emerged linked to environmental issues 
and road adoption, were not seen as the responsibility of one specific 
organisation. Other planned amenities such as a leisure and fitness centre (open 
to all residents at affordable prices), and a bus route either did not materialise or 




A central theme in the interviews conducted was the problems associated with 
the local authority nomination agreements and the allocation policies adopted by 
the social landlords. The local authority policy of giving priority to households in 
the greatest level of need mean that high numbers of dependent children, single 
parents, and vulnerable tenants including people with mental health problems 
were housed in the area. These are familiar concerns for contemporary social 
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landlords, but it was the level of concentration of such groups within the estate 
over a relatively short period of time that had led to severe management 
problems. Many of the comments stressed the point that real deterioration took 
place with a ‘tipping point’ (Gladwell, 2002) occurring in the late 1990s. Thus, the 
estate was viewed as relatively settled when it was built, but the high child 
density had brought later consequences: ‘The problem is that now the children 
have grown up’ (Interview, RSL manager).  
 
The Page (1993) report warned that the child to adult ratio on new RSL estates 
was likely to be unsustainable. Page recommended that developments consist of 
one third family housing to two thirds single person flats. In contrast consortium 
estates witness much higher child densities.  
 
The resident survey conducted in 2002 supports the view that the estate 
comprises a disproportionate number of family households. Figure 1 illustrates 
the socio-economic profile of the estate compared to the ward and borough data. 
The social, economic and demographic picture, which emerges from these 
figures, strongly contrasts with the surrounding area, with disproportionate 
number of young person households, very low numbers of elderly households 
and low levels of economic activity. 
 
The concentration of poverty, families with children and young people on the 
estate was the direct result of how the social housing finance regime of the first 
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half of the 1990s interacted with the wider housing market and the nature of 
housing need and homelessness of that period.  The neighbourhood and any so 
called ‘neighbourhood effects’ are the latent effects of the housing policy that 
created this estate and its socio-economic profile. 
 
Table 1 to be inserted here. 
 
This profile has compounded some of problems of marginalisation of groups 
found within the neighbourhood. Many respondents mentioned who gains access 
to the properties as a key issue, needing strategic intervention. Thus ‘the only 
transfer offers on to the estate have been management priorities, these are 
people who are already vulnerable. Others who are given properties are people 
who have been homeless, refugees and rough sleepers. 95% of these people 
are extremely vulnerable’ (Interview, RSL manager). 
 
A number of interviewees expressed criticism of local authority policies in this 
respect, stressing that they had little choice and autonomy in who was housed 
into the neighbourhood. I don’t think the local authority have looked at the issue 
strategically (Interview, RSL manager). 
 
One respondent contrasted the experience of local authority and RSL residents: 
‘On a local authority estate you have normally had 25-30 years to develop a 
sense of community. You cannot develop a community over 8 years’ (Interview, 
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community development officer). A similar view was expressed by a local 
authority worker: ‘There is no cultural core of working class people who have 
lived a different life. There are low levels of employment and training. They are 
not estates where people have chosen to live; where there is pride and affection 
through the living memory of people Theirs’ has been an alienating experience 
from day one’ (Interview, local authority officer). 
 
Many respondents mentioned that the area was seen as a ‘dumping ground for 
some real bad elements in society’ (Interview, owner occupier). The estate 
therefore was perceived as a magnet for a range of social problems that ‘this 
was an unnatural community; the mix was unnatural’ (Interview, neighbourhood 
manager). 
 
The lack of joined up working 
 
The third main difficulty resulting from the consortium structure was the 
management problem that the variety of housing providers was unable to 
exercise adequate control and to establish clear lines of responsibility. A strong 
theme in the interviews was the problems caused by a lack of standard 
procedures, protocols, service level agreements, and management staff 
continuity. These issues have exacerbated the management problems. One of 
the main complaints was that there was a lack of clearly agreed procedures, that 
policies were haphazard and not clearly understood. In particular, there was 
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condemnation that other landlords were failing to provide an adequate level of 
service. 
 
The way the scheme has been managed has created problems. We have 
dealt with our problems but others have not (Interview, RSL manager). 
 
Similarly, with regard to specific services, a lack of co-ordination was affecting 
the quality of service delivery with complaints about ‘Landlords not pulling their 
weight’ (Interview, RSL manager). 
 
A recurring theme in the interviews was that a lack of cohesion in service delivery 
had been exacerbated by the lack of continuity in personnel. Hence, the 
knowledge base was low with little written information collected; when staff left 
they were often not replaced or were replaced by temporary staff. There was not 
one person who had gained knowledge of the local area who had carried out 
their duties since the beginning of the scheme. Normally this would not matter 
but in the case of an estate where there was confusion from the start, the 
neighbourhood appeared to be exceptionally difficult manage.  
 
Problems included a high turnover of staff in management posts and the 
demands and frustrations of dealing with situations where control was very 
difficult to exert. The high turnover, which was mentioned by all the RSL 
interviewees, related to what was seen as the unpopularity of having to take 
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responsibility for a highly complex and frustrating ‘patch’ of properties. Residents 
and staff were unclear as to who had responsibility for different parts of the 
estate (particularly when another landlord was involved) and knowledge of the 
local area suffered as a consequence. In particular vital documents such as 
contract management agreements and specifications for service delivery had 
either been mislaid or had never been written. There was a lack of clarity about 
lines of responsibility for cleaning, caretaking duties and ownership of common 
areas due to the lack of an effective management agreement and database. 
 
The research team found great difficulty in obtaining accurate information about 
property ownership (including basic information such as numbers of units owned 
and how many RSLs were involved). The small RSLs did not attend the 
management group meetings and people were not aware of who the key 
contacts were for many of the landlords. There were also problems of 
confidentiality relating to some of the specialist managing associations who did 
not want their properties to be identified. One of the key individuals in the estate 
was the community caretaker. An individual who had formerly carried out this role 
commented:  
 
the main road has 140 properties and 6 different landlords on it – so each 
landlord is doing their own thing…I had 7 different lists of maintenance 
contracts. It was like a telephone directory;  you had to know which housing 
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association was responsible for this bit of grass and this bit of pavement 
(Interview, former caretaker). 
 
Part of the difficulty for the RSLs was that they had very different resource bases. 
Not only are residents paying widely different rents and service charges but also 
the ability to fund the services varied considerably. Thus: 
 
the rents are all different, which the tenants all talk to each other about. 
Some of the rents were varying by as much as £20 a week for the same 
properties in the same road and the services the tenants were getting 
varied from association to association. Some of the bigger associations 
have bigger pools of money while the smaller one’s don’t. So what the 
smaller associations offer is going to be vastly lower than what a bigger one 
could offer (Interview, RSL  manager). 
 
Other managers mentioned that there the lack of a co-ordinated approach 
continued to hinder the active development of the estate: ‘it’s the consortium not 
talking to each other that is the real problem’ (Interview, community development 
manager) 
 
Many of the above problems are common to all social landlords, but there was a 
feeling that the style of post 1988 consortium developments exacerbated the 
management difficulties and presented barriers to the implementation of effective 
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practical solutions. Such commentators drew a distinction between different 
types of RSLs. Consequently, some were viewed as innovative whereas others 
were seen as far more conservative. ‘It seems that they [the progressive HAs] 
constantly have to drag others along behind them’ (Interview, local authority 
officer). The research team found that there were significant differences in the 
approaches of the separate organisations both large and small. One specific 
problem related to information gaps, particularly where there was a highly 
confusing mixture of owners and managing agents. In such circumstances, it was 
almost impossible to determine ownership patterns (without in-depth research 
involving the triangulation of many data sources). The community caretaker only 
acted for the four largest organisations and did not have details of all the 
managing agents. This information gap was often due to confidentiality but made 
reporting repairs for vulnerable residents extremely difficult. One commentator 
expressed the central problem in the following terms: 
 
It operates by divide and rule. As there are so many different landlords and 
different systems they cannot coalesce around any issue. Problems 
become extremely complex (Interview, local authority officer). 
 
In addition to these three problems of development, allocation and coordination a 




Anti-social behaviour (ASB) 
 
One of the main consequences of the consortium structure was that the issue of 
anti-social behaviour assumed great prominence in resident perceptions of the 
area, particularly given the high number of households with children and low 
number of elderly residents. The management difficulties were compounded by 
the fact that a number of different landlords had responsibility for separate 
properties adjacent to each other.  
 
Anti-social behaviour is a particular problem when you have multi-landlord 
disputes…There is a tendency to believe what your own tenant is saying 
against a tenant of another landlord. There is little communication between 
front-line officers (Interview, RSL manager). 
 
Consequently the estate was not only likely to be more susceptible to Anti Social 
Behaviour (ASB) due to the child density but also less equipped to deal with 
these problems once they had manifested themselves. Figure 1 illustrates a 
sharp decline in residents feeling safe on the estate compared to in their own 
homes (from 95% to 55%). These figures compare unfavourably to the same 
question asked of residents on a local authority high-rise estate in the ward 
where 76% reported that they felt safe on their estate. 
 
Figure 1 to be inserted here. 
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Source: resident survey, 2002 
 
Moreover, such figures also compare unfavourably with national data. The Crime 
survey for England and Wales 2002/03 (Home Office 2003) found that 13 percent 
of respondents said that they felt ‘very unsafe’ walking alone in their area after 
dark and a further 21 per cent felt ‘a bit unsafe’.  Only one percent felt unsafe 
alone in their own home and five percent reported being ‘a bit unsafe’.  While a 
direct comparison is not possible given the different wording used in the survey 
questions it is important to note that the percentage feeling unsafe in the street 
and the area appears to be much higher on the estate than in the national survey 
(45% compared to 24%). 
 
ASB was linked with particular areas of the estate. There appeared to be a 
number of specific flashpoints where youths congregated and where 
confrontations were commonplace. In particular some owner-occupiers suffered 
as one of their gated entrances was next to a shop where youths tended to 
congregate. This created a threatening environment with some youths attempting 
to gain entrance to these properties: 
 
we stay away from the shop and gym area. Things have really gone down 
over the last two years – muggings, graffiti, rubbish dumping, break-ins and 
drugs. People are afraid to go out … they are shocked by what is going on 
(Interview with resident) 
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Resolution of these problems requires careful co-ordination of a range of service 
providers (particularly involving police services) and may require strong action in 
the form of evictions. However, the evidence of the study showed that consortium 
schemes presented significant barriers to bringing together these different 
agencies.  
 
Cross-tenure conflicts  
 
A second consequence of the consortium structure was that the estate was 
divided not only by landlords but also by different tenure types, thus exacerbating 
conflicts between tenants, leaseholders and owner-occupiers. A number of 
earlier studies have identified the potential for conflict between social housing 
residents and owner-occupiers (for example Pawson et. al., 2000; Beekman et. 
al., 2001).  
 
As noted above, one of the central issues affecting the quality of life of the 
residents was the sense that they were living in an unsafe environment due to 
the high incidence of anti-social behaviour caused by youths on the estate. The 
insecurity of residents was compounded by an impression that certain groups 
(such as leaseholders and owner-occupiers) were being targeted by the social 
housing tenants and their children. These residents stressed that they were 
happy with their property but that the external environment was intimidating 
particularly at night-time. As an example an owner occupier stated: ‘We really 
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love where we live but there is an element that lives here that is really dragging 
the place down and ruining it’ (Interview, owner occupier). 
 
The owner occupiers living on the estate strongly felt that they had been 
specifically singled out for intimidation and vandalism, reporting numerous break-
ins, theft of post and vandalism on a constant basis. 
 
There is definitely a bad feeling towards the people living in these flats 
because we are owners. There is a definite class divide…We are really the 
centre of attention (Interview, owner occupier). 
 
The frustration felt by these residents was compounded by a sense that their 
voice was not listened to by the social housing managers. Their perception 
created an inevitable division between the different groups on the estate and 
constrained the ability to create a common resident body. 
 
One of the main targets had been the caretaker of the private leasehold 
properties. Thus ‘there has been a lot of violence and vandalism directed 
personally at the caretaker’ (Interview, leaseholder). Another owner occupier felt 
that her block, located in the centre of the development was left to bear the brunt 




What appeared to prevent an effective response from residents was the sense of 
intimidation: 
 
 I made sure that I never ever gave my name on any forms. It had to be 
done covertly which is a shame. You can tell that people are basically 
frightened (Interview, owner occupier). 
 
The leaseholders and owner-occupiers felt resentful that their voice was not 
effectively heard. In contrast RSL managers felt that these groups had a 
disproportionate influence on decisions, as they knew how to manipulate the 
system (Interview, community development officer). Whatever the truth, what 
was clear was that these conflicts prevented an effective and coherent resident 
view being expressed by the different groups on the estate.  There was no doubt 
that this level of fear had had a considerable impact upon the quality of life for all 
residents. 
 
Because of the people here and because they seem to have a majority 
now, everyone else is scared. They shut down in their little homes and no 
one goes out. (Interview, owner occupier). 
 
Crucially it is this vicious cycle of fear and intimidation that constitutes a great 
deal of the suspicion between different resident groups. It is these kinds of 
problems that need to be addressed by those responsible for the development of 
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mixed-tenure and multi-landlord estates. The fact that the gated community and 
the private rented housing on the estate are completely separately managed 
(and excluded by the local authority from its neighbourhood definition of the 
estate) also reinforced a divisive ‘them and us’ culture which is only slowly being 
broken down. The driving force to rectify these problems has not been the 
housing management teams, but a combination of local authority involvement via 
Neighbourhood renewal and the community development teams of the larger 
RSLs working in partnership. 
 
The absence of leadership and political marginalisation 
 
As noted earlier, problems of coordination created a vacuum in terms of 
responsibility, with different landlords anxious to absolve themselves from blame 
whilst laying responsibility upon others. This neglect was perceived to emanate 
at a local authority level and thence to filter down to other organisations working 
on the estate. Thus as one member of staff explained: ‘There were steering 
meetings where area directors met quarterly but each housing association still 
did their own thing and they very rarely ever did anything jointly’ (Interview, 
former caretaker). The research team observed that the participation of local 
authority members was negligible. The estate profile did not appear to present a 
strong political constituency. The two local councillors responsible for the 
neighbourhood only attended one meeting during the research period at which 
 29 
they spoke briefly to express their support for the regeneration process and then 
left immediately. 
 
This absence of leadership over time reinforced a sense that change had 
become impossible and residents became resigned to their conditions. As the 
estate began to acquire a damaging reputation, new vacancies were occupied by 
groups experiencing multiple deprivation and consequently the stigma attached 
to the area intensified. One of the consequences of the level of deprivation is that 
residents were seen as passive, isolated and with little voice in effecting 
changes. As a housing manager commented:  
 
Interestingly we don’t receive so many complaints from residents. It has 
become part of their environment. I think that the perception is that the 
police don’t deal with it so what chance have the housing association got? 
(Interview, RSL manager). 
 
The complexity is a distinctive feature of consortium estates and is not one that 
has been effectively addressed in the research literature. The consortium 
development compounded problems of marginalisation and alienation felt by 
residents and staff. As one local authority officer commented, a lack of promotion 
for specific groups resulted in a high level of political neglect.  
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There are political gaps…there are obvious gaps in coordination. There is no 
champion for the area…it is not seen as a local authority problem, so there is 
a lack of adequate advocacy for the area (Interview, local authority officer). 
 
In similar terms a community development officer talked of tenants as being 
‘silent’ (Interview). It is unlikely that this lack of voice is due to resident 
satisfaction. 68% of residents reported that they thought the estate was getting 
worse, 74% responded that drug or alcohol abuse was a major problem and 60% 
would not recommend living in the area to a friend (resident survey). 
Respondents reported that the level of marginalisation felt by residents was likely 
to be exacerbated in a RSL consortium development. Thus: 
 
Housing associations are social enterprises but they put enterprise before 
delivery of social capital. In that sense there is not much difference between 
their management and that of a private landlord. They are interested in 
delivering more houses but their tenants do not get the level of support they 
need…It is peculiar that an estate so small has so many landlords. The 
residents themselves have no sense of social justice, if they cannot act as a 
collective body that is extremely disempowering and alienating (Interview, 
local authority officer). 
 
Such comments strike at the heart of what RSLs are attempting to achieve. They 
were initially propounded as alternatives to local authority bureaucracies, but as 
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they struggle with the challenges of residualisation, development and complex 
management structures, they may be exacerbating the political marginalisation of 
those they are attempting to support. What changed the perception of the estate 
was that finally some neighbourhood renewal funding was made available, that 
research was commissioned and that the problem was taken seriously by the 
different interest groups. Significantly the local authority adopted its strategic 
enabling role for the first time. It was clear that resident demands were only taken 




For RSLs the combination of poorly coordinated management, multiple 
ownership, and an allocation policy driven by addressing homelessness created 
a cumulative ‘neighbourhood effect’ that landlords struggled to deal with in the 
1990s. Consortium schemes have resulted in too many management 
organisations being responsible for a small number of properties. Their lack of 
experience in this type of management arrangement meant that there was no 
existing template for consortium management that they could draw upon. 
Crucially, these management defects were exacerbated by a lack of strategic 
vision demonstrated by the various social landlords who had responsibility for 
these schemes.  
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The case study showed that RSLs clearly had substantial experience in 
development and certain forms of management. However, housing association 
management skills suitable for 1970s street regeneration schemes are less 
suitable for the challenges of the socio-economic and behavioural experiments of 
the 1990s. In particular all the landlords (as well as government agencies) 
underestimated the amount of management needed on these estates. The socio-
economic features of the resident population combined with the peculiarities of 
the management arrangements produced a potent mixture of problems.  
 
There are three specific problems identified within the case study estate. First, 
the initial development programme, although including plans for facilities and 
amenities, was not carried through. The associations were poorly prepared and 
inexperienced in this sort of development. Crucially, the development planning 
was not carried forward into an effective and sustainable management structure 
and there was inadequate support from the statutory agency who perceived their 
role as negligible.  
 
Second, there was a lack of genuine partnership in spite of much of the rhetoric 
about housing association schemes. Vested interests and the pressures of 
competition ensured that associations continued to operate in a defensive and 
non-collaborative environment. The ‘pepper-potting’ nature of the development 
produced a complex set of arrangements which required careful unravelling 
simply to find out who was responsible for addressing day-to-day problems. 
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RSLs found themselves caught in a variety of inter-landlord relationships without 
an awareness of who held ultimate responsibility for many of the issues. Those 
who did have some level of knowledge were found to have left their jobs and the 
organisations had not put in place systems to capture this knowledge. Not only 
was management information about ownership hidden from residents; it was also 
hidden from managers themselves. There were significant difficulties in even 
finding out accurate lists of ownership. These problems were compounded by 
management from afar in remote housing association central offices and where 
housing officers rarely visited their properties. 
 
Third, the allocations policies have been well-documented but the case study 
estate shows how these cumulative pressures of allocating to large numbers of 
children, vulnerable and deprived groups helps to create a highly unstable 
community, which aggravated the anti-social behaviour of the residents as well 
as drawing other anti-social behaviour onto the estate. Equally importantly there 
was no evidence of willingness to learn from mistakes as those dealing with the 
day-to-day problems did not appear to possess the ability to see the wider 
picture. 
 
A lack of clarity about responsibility linked to property rights and a failure to 
develop an effective multi-landlord management vehicle stand out as the key 
weaknesses on this case study and other similar estates. Interviews with housing 
staff revealed that wherever they have developed via a consortium structure 
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these types of management failures have resulted. Disproportionate 
consequences follow from the lack of an effective multi-landlord management 
vehicle and the related weaknesses in the coordination of all the different 
agencies working on such estates. The tendency of the RSLs to operate on the 
basis of mutual suspicion rather than partnership was compounded by reluctance 
on the part of the local authority to view issues on the estate as a high political 
priority. Other agency involvement was dependent on highly motivated 
individuals taking the initiative to make changes on the estate. The key lesson 
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Table 1 Selected socio-economic profile of the estate, compared to ward 










Aged 0-15 43 
 
23 20 






Family and lone parent households (HH) 69 42 52 
One parent HH with children as % of family HH 28 19 15 
Economically active 55 42 52 
Un-employed as a % of economically active 
 
33 8 7 
Caring for family member at home 
 
25 6 8 
Long-term sick/disabled 14 3 2 
Annual income below £10,000 36 24 18 
Receiving income support 
 
39 33 19 
Receiving council tax & housing benefit 64 39 18 
Pupils attaining 5 GCSEs A-C 
 
38 44 47 
Pupils with free school meals entitlement 
 
48 33 26 
 
This table is constructed from three data sources: the resident survey, 2002, local authority ward 
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